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Abstract 
Research from economics and psychology suggests that behavioral 
interventions can be a powerful climate policy instrument. This paper 
provides a systematic review of the existing empirical evidence on non-price 
interventions targeting energy conservation behavior of private households. 
Specifically, we analyze the four nudge-like interventions referred to as social 
comparison, pre-commitment, goal setting and labeling in 38 international 
studies comprising 91 treatments. This paper differs from previous systematic 
reviews by solely focusing on studies that permit the identification of causal 
effects. We find that all four interventions have the potential to significantly 
reduce energy consumption of private households, yet effect sizes vary 
immensely. We conclude by emphasizing the importance of impact 
evaluations before rolling out behavioral policy interventions at scale.  
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1. Introduction 
Climate change mitigation programs are on the political agenda worldwide. 
As a result of ambitious CO2-reduction goals, policymakers are increasingly 
interested in non-price interventions targeting private household energy 
consumption. Both economic and psychological research has shown that 
behavioral interventions – also referred to as nudges – can be powerful tools 
in shaping people’s behavior in a variety of domains (see, among others, the 
influential publication by Thaler and Sunstein 2008).1 Non-price measures are 
relatively inexpensive to implement and do not interfere with people’s choice 
sets as strongly as, for example, taxes or bans on certain products. 
Consequently, policy makers are now exploring nudges as a cost-effective 
approach for reducing energy consumption (Allcott 2015). If proven effective, 
these interventions could be established as an integral and complementary 
component of climate change policy (Allcott and Mullainathan 2010). This is 
why researchers are increasingly interested in understanding the effect of non-
price measures on residential energy consumption. 
This paper presents findings of a systematic review of the effectiveness 
of behavioral interventions to induce energy conservation. We study the 
following four interventions: social norms, commitment devices, goal setting, 
and labeling. Furthermore, the review focuses on “higher quality” studies. To 
this end, we only include those studies that employ an empirical estimation 
strategy enabling the identification of a causal relationship between a policy 
intervention and consumption behavior. To our knowledge, it is the first study 
that systematically reviews all published results from behavioral economics 
and related areas of research that are based on a rigorous evaluation of causal 
effects.  
                                                          
1 The fact that the book Nudge (Thaler and Sunstein 2008) has already been cited more than 7,000 times 
can be seen as one indicator of a growing academic interest in behavioral interventions (cf. Allcott and 
Kessler 2015). 
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Our study builds on a few earlier reviews that only focus on a subset of 
our interventions. Many of these point to potential problems of including 
effects from correlational studies in their sample, i.e. studies that are not able 
to disentangle causation from correlation. Abrahamse et al. (2005) evaluate the 
effectiveness of some interventions aiming to encourage households to reduce 
energy consumption. They conclude that information has an influence on 
knowledge, but does not necessarily result in behavioral changes or energy 
savings. Rewards have effects on energy conservation, but they are rather 
short-lived. Feedback, in particular when it is given frequently, can also be 
effective. More recently, Karlin et al. (2015) conducted a meta-analysis on the 
effect of feedback on energy usage. They conclude that feedback is effective 
but with significant variation in effects. Furthermore, Delmas et al. (2013) 
analyze the effect of information strategies on energy savings and find a 
substantial reduction effect on average. However, in a similar vein as 
Abrahamse et al. (2005), they conclude that the effect diminishes with the rigor 
of the study, indicating potential methodological issues in the considered 
literature. In particular, none of the existing reviews takes into account 
whether the considered studies apply a method that has the potential to 
identify the causal effect of the intervention, which is critical to the question of 
its policy relevance (Imbens and Wooldridge 2009). 
Consequently, our systematic review differs from previous research by 
solely focusing on studies that have the potential to identify causal effects 
between the intervention and the outcome. Furthermore, we include articles 
published up to December 2015 in working paper series as well as peer-
reviewed journals to provide the most comprehensive and up-to-date account 
of research in economics and psychology. This is particularly important 
because there has been a growing number of high-quality studies in the recent 
past. Hence, our review comprises several very recent large-scale randomized 
controlled field experiments. As an additional contribution, our systematic 
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review is the first to account for labeling as a non-price intervention, which 
has been applied worldwide on a large scale and potentially affects millions of 
household decisions each year. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the subsequent section, we define and 
motivate the four considered interventions. Section 3 explains the 
methodology of the systematic review. In Section 4, we synthesize and discuss 
the results. Section 5 concludes with recommendations for researchers and 
policy makers. 
 
2. Behavioral interventions and energy conservation 
A considerable percentage of annual emissions in industrial countries is 
induced by residential energy consumption. In addition, private households 
are a prime target for behavioral interventions (Karlin et al. 2015). Households 
may conserve energy in two ways: First, they can change their consumption 
of energy services, for example by reducing lighting use. Second, they can 
modify their purchasing behavior and invest in energy efficiency, for example 
by buying a highly efficient washing machine.2 Behavioral interventions with 
the aim of inducing energy conservation can therefore target either the 
purchase decision or more directly the consumption behavior. Below we 
examine the four non-price interventions considered in our systematic review 
and their potential effects on energy-conservation behavior of private 
households. 
  
                                                          
2 The purchase of an energy efficient appliance will ultimately result in reduced energy consumption 
when expected energy savings are not completely offset by an increase in the use of the appliance, which 
is known as the rebound effect (see, for instance, Frondel and Vance 2013).   
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Social comparison 
Social comparison refers to the process of giving households information 
about their energy consumption in relation to the consumption of comparable 
households. Such a comparison is closely connected to also receiving feedback 
about one’s own behavior. The chosen reference group should be relevant for 
the treated household (Abrahamse et al. 2005) and can be, for instance, 
consumers of the same energy provider or households within the same 
postcode-level.  Moreover, the choice of the reference level is important: the 
household’s consumption can either be compared to the average consumption 
level of the reference group or to a more ambitious group, e.g. the most 
efficient 10 percent. 
The potential effect of a social comparison might be triggered by three 
phenomena. First, many people exhibit reference dependent preferences 
(Kahneman 2003). Accordingly, one reference point is social norms. 
Complying with these norms increases most individuals’ utility whereas 
deviating from it typically leads to disutility caused by social disapproval 
(Schubert and Stadelmann 2015). Second, in situations of uncertainty, 
individuals may use other peoples’ behavior as orientation by implicitly 
assuming that those others have more information about the socially desired 
behavior (Allcott and Mullainathan 2010, see also Delmas et al. 2013). 
Consequently, people tend to adjust their actions according to the prevalent 
group behavior. Third, social comparisons evoke feelings of competition 
(Abrahamse et al. 2005). This is especially important when the household’s 
consumption level lies above the average or above some threshold that the 
household perceives as desirable (for example, belonging to the most efficient 
10 percent of costumers). 
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Commitment Devices 
Commitment devices are “a set of interventions that allow individuals to lock 
themselves today into the action that they want to take tomorrow” (Allcott and 
Mullainathan 2010: 2). Examples of commitment devices are oral or written 
pledges or promises to conserve energy (Abrahamse et al. 2005). The 
commitment can either be a promise to oneself, or alternatively it can be made 
public.  
The idea behind voluntarily binding one’s own future behavior is that 
some people are aware that they sometimes have time-inconsistent 
preferences (O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999). For instance, as O’Donoghue and 
Rabin (2008) point out, many people procrastinate sometimes to the extent that 
the desired action is never taken.  
A commitment device helps individuals to overcome such time-
inconsistent preferences by providing a source of motivation: it compares the 
present situation with a desired future state (van Hoewelingen and van Raaij 
1989). When the commitment is a pledge to oneself, it appeals to a personal 
norm (the individual wants to satisfy expectations towards itself). A public 
commitment creates expectations by others, thereby leading to social pressure 
(Abrahamse et al. 2005). 
Goal Setting 
Goal setting combines commitment with a concrete reference point. Instead of 
pledging to conserve energy, a household specifically promises, for instance, 
“to reduce energy consumption by 10 percent within the next month”. Not 
only setting a reduction level but also a deadline for achieving this goal 
facilitates an evaluation of success or failure. This increases pressure but also 
motivation by making satisfaction conditional on a desired level of 
performance (van Houwelingen and van Raaij 1989). A goal can be chosen by 
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the household itself (being a form of commitment device) or externally set (for 
example by institutions). 
The underlying mechanisms explaining the potential effects of goal 
setting are similar to those of commitment devices: time-inconsistent 
preferences and a lack of self-control. In addition to that, a specific goal targets 
reference-dependent preferences (Abrahamse et al. 2005): individuals aim at a 
pre-determined level and judge their performance according to this reference 
point. Achievement of the goal provides a feeling of accomplishment, whereas 
failure creates disutility even if the goal level was externally set (Bandura 
1986).  
Labeling 
A label is a tag that summarizes information on a good in an easily accessible 
way. This can be achieved by presenting a selection of information about the 
product’s attributes on the label or by visualizing the most relevant 
information in a graphical manner. In the domain of energy consumption, 
labels can, for example, comprise information on energy usage levels of 
appliances or energy efficiency standards of houses.  
In principle, there are two different sorts of labels. Either the labeling 
program is voluntary and an appliance is awarded the label for satisfying 
certain criteria like the US Energy Star Label, or a label is mandatory for all 
appliances, as with the EU Energy Label. In the latter case, goods can be 
ranked according to their performance along the criteria specified by the label, 
for instance the EU energy efficiency classes. 
Consumers potentially respond to labels by ascribing more attention 
to certain features of the good. As a label makes selected criteria (more) salient, 
it aims at the availability heuristic, i.e. a simplifying rule that gives highly 
accessible features a stronger influence on decisions while information of low 
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accessibility will largely be ignored (Kahneman 2003). This remains true even 
when costs of gathering relevant information, for example on average usage 
levels or life expectancy of appliances, is low (Schubert and Stadelmann 2015).  
 
3. Methodology 
Following the guidelines for systematic reviews suggested by the Campbell 
Collaboration (2014), we take five successive steps to identify and analyze 
relevant studies: setting up criteria for including studies in the review, 
literature search, selection of studies, data extraction, and data analysis. 
3.1 Inclusion criteria (PICOS) 
As a first step, we developed a set of criteria along the so-called PICOS – an 
acronym for participants, interventions, comparisons, outcomes, and study 
designs (Campbell Collaboration 2014). The PICOS guided the selection of 
studies in the further process. We include studies targeting private households 
or individuals living in an industrialized or emerging country where the living 
situation (especially in regard to energy consumption) is comparable to an 
industrialized country. Studies focusing on energy consumption in official 
buildings or enterprise settings are excluded. 
Our focus is on the four interventions social comparison, commitment 
devices, goal setting, and labeling. We also consider combinations of these 
interventions with each other or with additional non-price measures (e.g. 
feedback, energy savings tips). In contrast, all studies combining these 
interventions with financial incentives (for instance, dynamic pricing) are 
excluded from the review, as long as they do not allow to identify the effect of 
the non-price intervention separately. 
Regarding the outcome, we include all studies that report an 
individual’s or household’s actual or self-assessed usage level of energy, gas, 
9 
 
or water. For labeling, we also consider secondary outcomes like the 
perception of and the willingness to pay for energy efficiency. These secondary 
outcomes influence usage levels via different channels (as discussed in Section 
2). 
We include all studies that permit the identification of the causal 
relationship between the intervention and the outcome of interest. Hence, 
studies are considered if their methodology is based on a higher quality causal 
inference design like randomized controlled trials (RCT), matching, 
difference-in-differences, instrumental variable estimation, and regression 
discontinuity design, or if they control for self-selection with alternative 
methodologies.3 Studies that do not employ methods suitable for identifying 
the causal effect of an intervention are excluded from the review. Overall, we 
apply no time restriction: all study results published in a journal or as working 
paper up until the end of 2015 are considered in the review.  
3.2 Literature search 
We used two main avenues to identify relevant studies: First, a keyword 
search in databases, and second, a backward search on relevant review 
studies. Before the database search, we pre-determined a systematic 
combination of keywords for each of the four interventions (see Appendix B1). 
These keywords were employed on two databases: EconLit, consisting of more 
than 785,000 articles from peer-refereed journals and acknowledged working 
paper series in economics, and ScienceDirect, accessing more than 13 million 
articles from journals in different disciplines, from which our study chose the 
disciplines “Economics, Econometrics, Finance”, “Psychology”, “Social 
Sciences”, “Environment”, and ”Energy”. This returned a total of 988 results. 
                                                          
3 For an excellent overview of high quality causal inference designs see Angrist and Pischke (2009) or 
Imbens and Wooldrigde (2009). 
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Additionally, we conducted backward searches in the literature of the 
following four review studies: Abrahamse et al. (2005), Delmas et al. (2013), 
Karlin et al. (2015) and Lokhorst et al. (2013). Of the 147 articles identified, we 
included 71 studies after ruling out duplicates. This garnered a total of 1,059 
studies for the screening process of this review (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Overview of results in the searching, screening and selection process4 
 
  
                                                          
4 The study by Kurz et al. (2005) investigates a social comparison treatment as well as labeling. Here it is 
categorized as a social comparison study. 
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3.3 Selection of studies 
All studies were screened by independently reading the title and abstract and 
assessing whether a study satisfied all inclusion criteria set up in the PICOS via an 
inclusion decision form (see Appendix B2). We excluded 926 studies due to this 
procedure, leaving 133 articles for full text screening (see Figure 1), which again was 
conducted independently. In cases of differing assessments, we consulted a third 
(independent) scientist and solved discrepancies by discussion. A common reason for 
exclusion was that studies discussed strategies for energy conservation behavior 
theoretically or approached it with a qualitative design without actually measuring 
the effect of an intervention. When screening the selected full text articles, the main 
reason for exclusion was that studies neither applied a higher quality causal inference 
design nor controlled for self-selection. In contrast, at the start of the screening process 
a majority of papers was completely off-topic. Finally, 37 articles satisfied the criteria 
of this systematic review. 
 
3.4 Data extraction 
We developed a detailed coding sheet (see Appendix B3) based on the guidelines of 
the Campbell Collaboration (2014). Two reviewers coded each study independently of 
each other according to the same criteria. In cases in which the extracted information 
was ambiguous (for instance regarding the method of causal inference design), we 
consulted a third (independent) scientist and discrepancies were solved by discussion. 
The results from the data extraction are summarized in a results table (see Appendix 
A1). 
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4. Results 
4.1 Brief characterization of included studies 
Research interest 
Among the considered interventions, social comparison has attracted the most 
research attention. While 20 independent studies tested at least one social comparison 
treatment, only nine evaluate the effects of goal setting and commitment. In the 
following analysis, we evaluate the latter two interventions together since most 
relevant studies are overlapping. Additionally, nine studies assess the impact of 
labeling. In terms of available treatment effects, the analysis of our systematic review 
can rely on 37 documented effects for social comparison, 26 for goal setting and 
commitment, and 26 for labeling. The difference in numbers between articles and 
treatment effects is due to the fact that many studies consider more than one relevant 
intervention or evaluate multiple versions of the intervention in question. 
Regarding the studies’ publication dates an interesting pattern emerges. While 
the peak of research interest in goal setting and commitment was in the 1980s, followed 
by a longer neglect and a recent rediscovery,5 labeling has been largely neglected up 
till 2011. Since then, we observe a growing academic interest in analyzing the impact 
of the intervention. Similarly, research interest in the causal effects of social 
comparison on energy consumption behavior is fairly recent: the overwhelming 
majority of studies was published after the year 2004, with 70% of studies in this sub-
sample (14 articles) being more recent than 2010. 
Methods  
For social comparison and goal setting/commitment, one dominant method is applied, 
namely the evaluation via randomized controlled trials (RCT). This methodology not 
only produces a high internal validity but also has advantages in terms of external 
validity as it (in most studies) observes real-life behavior. In contrast, most of the 
                                                          
5 Two thirds of studies were published between 1978 and 1989, the remaining third since the year 2002. 
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studies on labeling are conducted as laboratory experiments or choice-experiments 
within online-surveys, which have low external validity. Specifically, researchers ask 
subjects, for instance, which appliance they would choose in a set of choices and 
attribute differences in choice patterns to the way the choice set is presented (which 
differs between control and treatment group). Obviously, such choices are not real 
purchases but rather decisions within a hypothetical and limited choice set. It is thus 
not certain whether the reported effects would also occur in a real world setting, and 
results should be treated with caution despite their high internal validity. However, a 
few studies also exploit a policy change as a natural experiment or conduct an RCT 
with a labeling intervention.  
Geographical location 
Most of the studies identified by the systematic review are located in the US. This is 
especially true for goal setting/commitment, which up to date only has been evaluated 
in the US and the Netherlands. For social comparison and labeling, studies are 
conducted in several countries, for instance Japan, Australia, Finland and Great 
Britain. The majority of published research on the two interventions, however, also 
targets a study population in the US.  
Combination of interventions 
For social comparison and goal setting/commitment, almost all studies combine the 
considered interventions with other treatments. This poses an immense challenge for 
identifying the actual effect of the intervention. It moreover makes it difficult to 
compare effects from different studies, as they do not evaluate the same treatment. 
Figure 2 shows that energy savings tips and a comparison of usage history are most 
popular among treatment combinations (see Figure 2). Within the sub-sample of 
studies that allow identification of the pure effect by not combining the intervention 
with additional treatments, other limitations apply. For instance, the relevant social 
comparison studies suffer from methodological shortcomings (e.g. no reported effect 
sizes). For goal setting and commitment devices, there are substantial differences 
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regarding the intensity of the treatment, because the required level of the goal varies 
as well as the criterion whether the level was self-selected or externally set. All in all 
this prohibits arriving at a coherent picture regarding the existing empirical evidence 
on the pure effects of the considered interventions. 
Figure 2: Additional interventions combined with social comparison and with goal 
setting/commitment treatment 
 
Outcomes 
The vast majority of studies on social comparison and goal setting/commitment focus 
on actual or self-assessed energy consumption as their outcome of interest. For 
labeling, the case is different. Most studies evaluate the effect of labels on the 
willingness to pay for energy efficient appliances, followed by studies on an estimation 
of the energy savings potential or hypothetical purchase decisions regarding energy 
efficient appliances (see Figure 3). Only one labeling-study looks at actual energy 
consumption. Consequently, the quality of empirical evidence differs between the 
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interventions: While the majority of labeling studies are based on stated preferences 
approaches (with their well-known limitation of hypothetical nature compared to 
revealed preferences), for the other interventions most studies analyze real behavior. 
Figure 3: Analyzed outcomes in studies with a labeling treatment 
 
 
4.2 Synthesis of the evidence 
4.2.1 Social Comparison 
Overall, the empirical evidence suggests that social comparison is an effective 
treatment. All but two of the 20 studies present statistically significant results in at least 
one of their analyzed treatment groups.6 A social comparison intervention results in a 
reduced energy consumption of private households ranging from 1.2% to 30% 
compared to the control group (see Figure 4). The only study showing an increase in 
energy usage level is Schultz et al. (2007) in one of their treatment groups. Yet, the 
respective treatment group was deliberately restricted to low users only, 
demonstrating the so called boomerang effect, i.e. that a social comparison can lead to 
                                                          
6 The study of Hakaana et al. (1997) is not considered in this regard, as the article does not report any 
significance levels at all. 
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adverse effects for the group that performs well in the comparison. They additionally 
show that the boomerang effect can be eliminated by adding an injunctive message. 
With regard to other outcomes, Komatsu and Nishio (2015) find a significant (positive) 
effect of the social comparison treatment on the motivation to conserve energy.  
Figure 4: Estimated Effects of Social comparison by medium 
 
 
 
Note: Studies are sorted by treatment-medium and in alphabetical order. Effects of studies that do not report significance levels are 
depicted as nil-effects. “sg” and “avg” stand for “study group” and “average”, respectively. Comment: The studies of Komatsu 
and Nishio (2015) and Kantola et al. (1984) are not included in the graph as they do not mention the magnitude of the measured 
significant conservation effects. 
The heterogeneity of effects may be attributed to the medium via which the 
household receives the social comparison. As a tendency, we observe that online and 
In-Home-Display (IHD) treatments seem to result in a higher effect than letters. 
However, IHD-social comparisons are still underresearched. Another noteworthy fact 
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is that studies with higher sample sizes (above 80,000) find smaller effects (around 2%). 
Both observations are compatible with existing evidence from previous reviews 
(Karlin et al. 2015). 
One specific intervention design, the social comparison based “home energy 
reports” (HER) by the private company “Opower”, has attracted major research 
attention. Opower cooperates with numerous US-energy suppliers and mails the HER 
to more than ten million households in the United States with the aim of reducing 
electricity consumption. The HER is a two-page letter with a bar graph comparing the 
household’s energy consumption to its geographically nearest neighbors in similar 
house sizes on the first page and energy saving tips on the second page. Several high 
quality studies in this review (Allcott 2011; Ayres et al. 2013; Costa and Kahn 2013; 
Allcott and Rogers 2014) report significant, yet modest reduction effects. The empirical 
evidence for this specific intervention is outstanding as the internal and external 
validity for the US is high, long-term effects are documented and cost-benefit analyses 
are conducted.7 The numerous high quality studies can be seen as best practice for the 
evaluation of an intervention at large scale.  
In all studies, in which a comparison of two similar combinations of 
interventions is possible, the effect increases when social comparison is added to the 
treatment (Ferraro and Price 2013; Mizobuchi and Takeuchi 2013). Moreover, Schultz 
et al. (2015) find a significant reduction in energy consumption of 9% compared to an 
insignificant treatment effect, when social comparison is added to the initial treatment 
intervention. 
                                                          
7 On the basis of 111 RCTs that evaluate the HER, Allcott (2015) shows that even for the exceptional case that there 
exists many replications, program evaluations can still give systematically biased out-of-sample predictions due to 
a “site selection bias”. In this example, predictions from the first 10 replications substantially overstate efficacy 
because, among others, utilities in more environmentalist areas are more likely to adopt the program, their 
customers are more responsive to the treatment, and utilities initially target their treatment at higher-usage 
consumer subpopulations. In a very recent study, Andor et al. (2017) show that social comparison based home 
energy reports are most likely not a cost effective climate policy instrument in many countries, in particular in 
Europe, due to lower electricity consumption levels and carbon intensities. For a study population in Germany, 
they additionally measure a substantially smaller treatment effect of social comparison based home energy 
reports. 
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The only two studies that aim to identify the pure effect of social comparison 
have methodological limitations. Haakana et al. (1997) find that a pure social 
comparison treatment shows similar or smaller effects as a social comparison with 
energy savings tips. The study, however, provides no information about significance 
levels for any of the effects. Komatsu and Nishio (2015) analyze the self-assessment on 
one’s own consumption in regard to the neighbors’ consumption and the own 
motivation to conserve energy. They find ambiguous effects of the social comparison 
treatment, but do not report effect sizes. Moreover, the analysis is not based on actual 
behavior but solely relies on self-assessments. 
Some studies suggest that social comparison might also trigger adverse effects. 
Schultz et al. (2007) show that low users significantly increased their energy 
consumption after having learned that they are below-average users. This raises 
important questions regarding a tailored application of social comparison treatments. 
Furthermore, Tiefenbeck et al. (2013) investigate side-effects of a social comparison 
treatment. They find a significant reduction in water consumption of 6% after they 
provided weekly feedback about water consumption levels per capita, accompanied 
by a social comparison with the most efficient 10% of users, and tips about how to 
conserve water. At the same time, the electricity consumption of the treatment group 
increased by 5.6%. This result might be seen as first evidence of the so called moral 
self-licensing effect, the phenomenon that past good deeds favor a positive self-
perception that in turn creates licensing effects, leading people to engage in behavior 
that is less likely to be in line with their moral values (Nisan and Horenczyk 1990). If 
such side-effects occur, it is not clear whether an intervention induces sustainable 
behavior in a broader sense, even if the estimated treatment effect suggests a reduction 
of the ‘direct’ outcome (in this example: water consumption). 
In regard to long-term-effects, no clear picture emerges. Several studies 
document a reinforcement of effects in the long-run for some of their treatment groups 
(Delmas and Lessem 2014; Allcott and Rogers 2014; Dolan and Metcalfe 2013; Schultz 
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et al. 2007). In Staats et al. (2004), two initially insignificant short-term effects increase 
and become significantly different from the control group when measured two years 
after the intervention stopped. In other studies, treatment effects decrease (Ferraro et 
al. 2011; Schultz et al. 2015; Staats et al. 2004; Schultz et al. 2007), remain or become 
insignificant (Delmas and Lessem 2014; Dolan and Metcalfe 2013; Tiefenbeck et al. 
2013; Schultz et al. 2007). It would be desirable to identify the driving factors for these 
heterogeneous effects. Yet, based on the existing empirical evidence, we do not observe 
any obvious indications.8 As long-term-effects are crucial for the cost-effectiveness of 
the interventions, their analysis should be one focus of future research. 
In sum, social comparison presents an effective treatment. Yet, researchers and 
policy makers should closely monitor potential adverse effects on certain subgroups 
of households (below-average users) and on consumption patterns regarding other 
goods (moral licensing effect). Furthermore, the analysis of long-term-effects and cost-
benefit-analysis should be an inherent part of the impact evaluation. 
4.2.2 Goal Setting and Commitment Devices 
Many of the identified studies on goal setting and commitment suffer from 
methodological shortcomings, despite satisfying the criterion of applying a 
methodology suitable to identify a causal effect. For instance, they test several 
treatments in their RCT despite relying on very small study samples, or they do not 
report significance levels of results. Thus, the picture regarding an assessment of 
treatment effects is not quite clear: more than half of the documented effects are not 
significantly different from zero or cannot be depicted as such because no significance 
level is reported (see Figure 5). The reason for this may either be that the treatment 
                                                          
8 In a recent study, Brandon et al. (2017) explore the underlying mechanisms of long-run reductions in energy 
consumption induced by a social comparison (specifically the HER by Opower, see above). Using the data of 38 
natural field experiments, they find that the physical capital channel (e.g. insulating the house or buying a more 
energy efficient washing machine) is more important for the persistence of effects than habit formation within the 
household. 
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actually has no effect, or that the study’s features (in particular a not sufficiently 
powered sample) contribute to the result. 
Figure 5: Goal setting/commitment-effects by self-set or externally set goal 
 
Note: Studies are sorted by self-set and externally set goals/commitments and in alphabetical order. Effects of studies that do not 
report significance levels are depicted as nil-effects. “sg” stands for “study group”. 
Interpreting the results of the identified studies, self-set goals seem to result in 
a significant reduction effect when they are chosen realistically (Harding and Hsiaw 
2014; McCalley and Midden 2002; Winett et al. 1979). Harding and Hsiaw (2014) report 
from a field study with more than 12,000 households that the sub-sample selecting the 
achievable goal of energy conservation between 0% and 15% reduced their 
consumption by 11%. The authors still measure a significant reduction effect after 18 
months. At the same time, the treatment group that selected a more optimistic goal 
(15%-50%) also saved energy shortly after the start of the program. However, their 
effort vanished after they received feedback about their usage development, 
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presumably because they realized that it would be impossible to achieve the ambitious 
goal. In contrast, both sub-samples choosing either a zero-goal or a more-than-50% 
goal showed no behavior change at all. However, we have to note that the results could 
be caused by self-selection: people who are in general more motivated to conserve 
energy could have selected themselves into more realistic goals, while people who are 
generally unwilling to change their behavior chose zero or unrealistically ambitious 
goal levels. 
Goals that are externally set by the experimenters have resulted in either 
insignificant effects or energy savings up to 22% compared to baseline consumption 
(Figure 4). Many of the reported significant effects stem from Winett et al. (1982), who 
conducted two RCT studies, but with a relatively small sample size of in total 83 
households for five treatment groups. After having taken part in a meeting, 
researchers asked participants to sign a commitment to reduce their energy 
consumption by 15% within the next 35 days. In addition to frequent feedback about 
their progress, households received an audio tape with tips on how to save energy. 
One study was conducted during winter, the other one during summer. All but one of 
six treatment groups showed significant and relatively high reduction effects ranging 
from 11% to 22%. 
In another study, an externally set goal of 10% resulted in a significant energy 
conservation effect of about 12.3% (van Houwelingen and van Raaj 1989). The effect 
remained significant one year after the intervention. Abrahamse et al. (2007) measure 
a smaller, but still significant effect of a 5%-goal in their RCT. In addition to these 
findings, a laboratory study by McCalley and Midden (2002) points to energy saving 
potential of externally set goals of around 20%. 
On the other hand, Becker (1978) as well as Katzev and Johnson (1984) were not 
able to confirm significant effects of external goal setting in the field. Yet, in another 
study, Katzev and Johnson (1983) find that insignificant effects in the short-run become 
significant in the long-run.  
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In sum, goal setting and commitment still need substantial research efforts. The 
significant results point to a relatively high energy conservation potential of around 
10%, while at the same time we cannot rule out that many of the insignificant results 
are due to underpowered samples. It seems to be a promising avenue for further 
research to evaluate the effect of energy conservation goals with a well-powered study 
set up, especially goals that are externally set.  
4.2.3 Labeling 
All but two of the identified studies on labeling report significant results in at least a 
subsample of their study population. Regarding effect sizes, they also point to 
potentially pronounced effects of labeling. 
Five studies evaluate the effect of labels under real-world conditions. Brounen 
and Kok (2011) document significantly higher sales prices for houses with a “green” 
energy efficiency EU-label (classes A, B, C) than for comparable houses without such 
a label. Houde (2014) exploits two natural experiments concerning the Energy Star 
Label. He observes a significantly higher willingness to pay for refrigerators when they 
have the label. His analysis is based on a comparison of the same models of 
refrigerators before and after the criteria of the Energy Star Label were tightened. In 
the second study, the measured positive effect of the Energy Star Label on the 
willingness to pay for refrigerators is not significant. In a similar vein, Allcott and 
Taubinsky (2015) cannot find a significant effect of a label on the probability to 
purchase an energy-saving lightbulb in their RCT in a big electrical store in the US. In 
the study by Kurz et al. (2005), which provided the treatment group with labels on the 
consumption levels of the household’s own appliances, effects range from zero to a 
reduced energy consumption of 23%. 
The choice experiment of Heinzle (2012) shows that the willingness to pay for a 
more efficient TV significantly increases when consumers are given information on 
absolute operating costs over the course of ten years. However, it significantly 
decreases when the label provides information on annual operating costs. Study 
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participants in a further hypothetical choice experiment of Newell and Siikamäki 
(2014) show a significantly lower willingness to pay compared to the potential savings 
they could gain by operating a more efficient warm water processors when they only 
received information on consumption costs and CO2-emissions. Yet, once this 
information was accompanied by an Energy Star Label, the willingness to pay 
increased above the cost effective level.  
Waechter et al. (2015), moreover, show that energy efficiency classes strongly 
influence the consumer’s estimation of the energy consumption level of appliances, to 
the extent that people will make decisions based on the energy efficiency class even 
when concrete and readily apparent consumption information contradicts it. In 
addition, Ölander and Thøgersen (2014) provide evidence for the positive effect of 
visualizing information in form of a simple label: changing an energy efficiency scale 
from a complex “A+++ - D”-system to a simpler “A – G” more than doubled the 
probability that an energy-efficient device would be chosen. 
In sum, even though up to now there is not a vast amount of research on 
labeling, we identify a remarkable potential of the intervention. Not only do 
hypothetical purchase decisions in choice experiments confirm their effectiveness, but 
so too do evaluations of labels in the field. Future research should focus on different 
elements of labels, like the framing of costs or the mode of ranking, and test their 
separate and combined effects in the field. 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper conducted a systematic review of behavioral interventions to induce 
residential energy conservation. In contrast to the existing literature, this review 
focused on studies that permit the identification of the causal relationship between the 
intervention and the outcome of interest. In addition, it is the first review to cover 
labeling, an intervention that affects millions of people worldwide. 
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We find that all four interventions have the potential to significantly reduce energy 
consumption of private households. While the vast majority of studies documents a 
significant reduction effect for the social comparison intervention, results for the other 
interventions are mixed. Social comparison has been the most researched intervention, 
in terms of both quality and quantity. In particular, the several “Opower studies” that 
investigate the causal effect of social comparison based home energy reports on energy 
consumption deliver broad empirical evidence and can be seen as best practice for 
program evaluations of energy conservation interventions. Yet, even for this 
intervention, many open questions remain: What is the actual pure effect of social 
comparison? Under which circumstances do social comparisons cause adverse effects? 
How much does the effect of social comparison interact with the medium by which it 
is delivered? First evidence on these questions indicate that adverse effects seem to 
matter and that it can make a difference if the social comparison is delivered by a letter, 
electronically online or via IHD. 
Pre-commitment and goal setting have not yet been researched extensively, and 
existing studies show major methodological shortcomings mainly in terms of 
underpowered samples. Yet, studies that document significant effects show 
conservation potential of around 10%. It is thus a promising avenue for further 
research to evaluate these interventions with a sufficiently large study sample, 
preferably in the field. 
Although energy labels are applied worldwide, labeling is a very recent field of 
research. First evidence shows that labels can be effective with regard to the perception 
of and the willingness to pay for energy efficiency. Early results by laboratory 
experiments are confirmed by some first field studies. Because the existing empirical 
evidence is mostly based on stated preference approaches, though, a promising field 
of future research is the evaluation of the effects of labels by analyzing revealed 
preferences. 
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The review moreover clearly shows that the amount of studies that satisfy the 
quality criterion of causal inference increased in the last few years. There are 
presumably three reasons for this development: the improving quality of empirical 
research, an increasing interest in behavioral economics, and the need to find effective 
interventions to trigger energy conservation. However, there is still a lot to be done. 
Although we focused on ‘higher quality’ studies that are potentially able to identify 
causal effects, only few studies within the sample contain evidence to back up concrete 
policy recommendations. Obstacles are, for instance, insufficiently powered sample 
sizes, poor reporting of statistical tests, and study populations that are different from 
the target population. Furthermore, the minority of studies discusses the benefits and 
costs of the intervention, a prerequisite to give policy recommendations. 
To sum up, we are surprised how little we know. We therefore call for systematic 
evaluations of these and similar interventions potentially able to trigger energy 
conservation before a large-scale rollout. It seems surprising that an intervention such 
as labeling is applied worldwide but there is little knowledge about the actual impact.  
Future studies should focus on at least three crucial points: First, assess the causal 
effect of the intervention with a suitable methodology and a sufficiently powered 
sample that enables identification of even small effects with statistical precision. 
Second, researchers should refrain from combining too many different treatments. We 
need evidence on the pure effect of the chosen interventions before we begin to 
potentially reinforce this effect by additional treatments. Third, long-term effects of the 
intervention should be analyzed and the intervention costs should be documented in 
order to enable a careful cost-benefit-analysis on the treatment’s effectiveness. At best, 
interventions should be ex-ante evaluated before they are rolled out at large-scale, for 
instance by randomized field experiments within the target population.  
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Appendix A  
Table A1: “Final Results Table” 
                                                          
9 The identified articles have been categorized according to the interventions social comparison, commitment/goal setting, labeling, and are ordered based on their publication date within each category.  
n = sample size; n.a. = not available; CG = control group; ***, **, * significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Study9 Type of intervention 
[+ combination with additional interventions] 
and intervention design 
Effect (in %) in 
comparison to: 
control group / 
baseline 
n Dependent 
Variable 
Country Method of 
causal 
analysis 
Remarks 
 
Social Comparison 
Kantola et 
al. (1984)  
(1) Feedback, Social Comparison 
[+ Framing, Energy saving tips] 
Households were informed once by letter that they showed 
an above-average electricity consumption despite having 
stated in an earlier survey that they feel an obligation to save 
electricity (the message pointed to the dissonance between 
answers in the survey and their actual consumption) +  users 
were provided with pamphlets and cards on energy saving 
tips 
(1) 
significantly lower 
electricity 
consumption / n.a. 
118 Electricity AU RCT Long run effects:  
n.a. 
Costs:  
n.a. 
 
(2) Feedback, Social Comparison 
[+ Energy saving tips] 
Households were informed once by letter that they showed 
an above-average electricity consumption + users were 
provided with pamphlets and cards on energy saving tips  
(2) 
insignif. / n.a. 
(3) Control Group 
[+ Energy saving tips] 
users were provided with pamphlets and cards on energy 
saving tips  
(3) 
insignif. / n.a. 
(4) Control Group 
Participants received a Thank-You letter for taking part in 
the experiment 
(4) 
CG / n.a. 
Haakana 
et al. 
(1997)  
(1) Feedback, Social Comparison 
[+ Energy saving tips] 
Participants received feedback and other information 
according to their wishes. Most households opted for 
comparisons of their own energy consumption with similar 
households in Finland in addition to personalized tips and an 
energy conservation video 
(2) Feedback, Social Comparison 
[+ Energy saving tips] 
a)  
(1) n.a. / (-7)  
(2) n.a. / (-5)  
(3) n.a. / (-5)  
(4) n.a. / (+1) 
 
b)  
(1) n.a./ (-4) 
(2) n.a. / 0 
(3) n.a. / (+1) 
105 a) 
Electricity  
 
b) 
Water 
 
c) 
Gas 
FI RCT No information about significance 
of effects 
Long run effects:  
n.a.  
Costs:  
n.a.  
 
Study Type of intervention 
[+ combination with additional interventions] 
and intervention design 
Effect (in %) in 
comparison to: 
control group / 
baseline 
n Dependent 
Variable 
Country Method of 
causal 
analysis 
Remarks 
 
 
33 
 
As in treatment (1) but with tailored information in written 
form instead of a video  
(3) Feedback, Social Comparison 
As in treatment (1), but without any tailored information or 
energy saving tips  
(4) Control Group 
Participants of the Control Group didn´t know they were part 
of an experiment 
(4) n.a. / (+1)  
 
c)  
(1) n.a. / (-9)  
(2) n.a. / (-7) 
(3) n.a. / (-4) 
(4) n.a. / (-3) 
Staats et 
al. (2004) 
(1) Feedback, Social Comparison 
[+ Energy saving tips] 
Groups consisting of six to ten people met as „EcoTeams” 
once a month to discuss environmentally relevant behavior. 
During the sessions they received feedback about their 
energy savings. Topics at the meetings were: garbage, gas, 
electricity, water, transport and consumer behavior. 
(1)  
n.a. / (-4.6) [insignif.] 
 
(2) 
n.a. / (-20.5)** 
 
(3)  
n.a. / (-2.8) [insignif.] 
482 (1) 
Electricity 
 
(2) 
Gas 
 
(3) 
Water 
NL Diff-in-Diff Long run effects:  
(2 years after stop of the EcoTeam-
meetings) 
(1) (-7.6)** 
(2) (-16.9)** 
(3) (-6.7)** 
Costs:  
n.a.  
 
Schultz et 
al. (2007) 
(1) Feedback, Social Comparison 
[+ Comparison to usage history, Energy saving tips] 
Handwritten messages with information about how much 
electricity the households consumed in the previous week + 
descriptive normative information about the energy 
consumption of the average household in their neighborhood 
+ preprinted suggestions for how to conserve energy; sample 
restricted to high users 
(1) 
 n.a. / (-5.68)* 
287 Electricity US RCT Long run effects:  
(1) (-4.61) [insignif.] 
(2) (+9.66)** 
(3) (-5.97)* 
(4) (+1.0) [insignif.] 
Costs: 
n.a. 
 
(2) Feedback, Social Comparison 
[+ Comparison to usage history, Energy saving tips]  
Same intervention as in (1) but sample restricted to low users 
(2) 
 n.a./ (+8.57)* 
(3) Feedback, Social Comparison 
[+ Comparison to usage history, Energy saving tips, Graphical 
enhancement]  
Same intervention as in (1) + sad face, because the 
households’ consumption was above average 
(3) 
 n.a./ (-8.34)** 
(4) Feedback, Social Comparison 
[+ Comparison to usage history, Energy saving tips, Graphical 
Enhancement]  
(4) 
 n.a./ (+2.32) 
[insignif.] 
Study Type of intervention 
[+ combination with additional interventions] 
and intervention design 
Effect (in %) in 
comparison to: 
control group / 
baseline 
n Dependent 
Variable 
Country Method of 
causal 
analysis 
Remarks 
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Same intervention as in (2) + happy face, because the 
households consumed less than average 
Peschiera 
et al. 
(2010)  
(1) Feedback 
[+ Comparison to usage history, Reminder] 
Online-feedback about individual past and present electricity 
consumption + three weekly reminders to check the online-
tool 
(1) 
(-16) [insignif.] / (-30) 
[insignif.] 
83 Electricity US RCT  Long run effects:  
n.a.  
Costs:  
n.a.  
 
 (2) Feedback, Social Comparison 
[+ Comparison to usage history, Reminder] 
As in treatment (1) + comparison of the individual electricity 
consumption with the average consumption of the rest of the 
building  
(2) 
(-6) [insignif.] / (-22) 
[insignif.] 
    
 (3) Feedback, Social Comparison 
[+ Comparison to usage history, Reminder] 
As in treatment (2) + information about the electricity 
consumption of “peers” (i.e. occupants of the building who  in 
a pre-survey the treated households classified as “known”)  
(3) 
(-21)*** / (-34)*** 
    
 (4) Control Group 
Participants knew they were part of an experiment 
(4) 
CG / n.a. 
    
Allcott 
(2011) 
(1) Feedback, Social Comparison 
[+ Comparison to usage history, Energy saving tips] 
Monthly / bimonthly/ quarterly feedback via mail (Home 
Energy Report with personal history of consumption, 
comparison to neighbors and tips to save energy)
(2) Control Group 
No information about participation in study
(1) 
(-2,03)*** / n.a. 
 
(2) 
CG / n.a. 
588 446 Electricity US RCT Short-term effect measured one 
year after intervention.  
Long run effects :  
According to the author there is no 
evidence of a reduction of the effect 
with the treatment lasting for two 
years, but no specific numbers 
stated (although, see Allcott and 
Rogers (2014)) 
Costs:  
Costs of production and shipping of 
the reports divided by kWh of saved 
energy: 3,31 Cents/kWh 
 
Ferraro et 
al. (2011) 
+ 
(1) Control Group 
[+ Energy saving tips] 
Onetime letter with tips to save energy
(1) 
(-0,66) (insign.) /  
(-8,41) 
106 669 Water US RCT Long run effects (measured two 
years after intervention) 
(1) +0,9 (insign.) / n.a. 
Study Type of intervention 
[+ combination with additional interventions] 
and intervention design 
Effect (in %) in 
comparison to: 
control group / 
baseline 
n Dependent 
Variable 
Country Method of 
causal 
analysis 
Remarks 
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Ferraro and 
Price 
(2013) 
(2) Feedback 
[+ Energy saving tips, Framing (social norm)] 
Onetime personalized letter with heavily norm-based 
language about saving water, feedback from the consumption 
bill, tips to save energy
(2)  
(-2,7)*** / (-10.08)
(2) (-0,22) (insign.) / n.a. 
(3) (-1,3)** / n.a. 
Costs:  
$ 0,575 per saved 1 000 gallons ( = 
3 785,41 Liter) of water 
 
(3) Feedback, Social Comparison 
[+ Energy saving tips, Framing (social norm)] 
Like (2) plus a comparison to the median water consumption 
of the preceding summer and a classification of the household 
into one of the consumption groups
(3) 
(-4,8)*** / (-12.01)
(4) Control Group 
No information about participation in experiment
(4) 
CG / (-7,83)
Peschiera 
and Taylor 
(2012) 
(1) Feedback, Social Comparison 
[+ Comparison to usage history] 
Participants get access to their electricity consumption data 
through an online-tool + information about consumption of 
the last seven days + a comparison with the average 
residential electricity use + weekly reminders to check the 
online-tool 
(1) 
0 [insignif.] / n.a.  
88 Electricity US RCT Effects are calculated for above-
average users only. If below-average 
users are included in the sample, the 
effects turn insignificant. 
Long run effects:  
n.a.  
Costs:  
n.a.  
  
(2) Feedback, Social Comparison 
[+ Comparison to usage history] 
Same intervention as in (1) + data about the electricity use of 
“peers” i.e. occupants of the building the treated households 
mentioned to “know” in a pre-survey 
(2) 
(-8.8)** / n.a.  
(3) Control Group 
Participants knew they were part of an experiment 
(3) 
CG / n.a. 
Ayres et al. 
(2013) 
(1) Feedback, Social Comparison 
[+ Energy saving tips, Comparison to usage history, Graphical 
enhancement] 
Home Energy Reports (HER) about electricity consumption via 
mail, monthly for heavy users, quarterly for light users, with 
tips to save energy, personal history of consumption and 
comparison to neighbors (additionally laughing or sad smiley, 
depending on consumption being below- or above-average)
(1)  
(-2,02)*** / n.a.
84 000 (1) + (2): 
Electricity 
 
(3) Gas
US RCT 
 
Long run effects:  
n.a. 
Costs:  
(1) 4.94 Cents per kWh saved 
(2) 1.78 Cents per kWh saved 
(3) n.a. 
 
Study Type of intervention 
[+ combination with additional interventions] 
and intervention design 
Effect (in %) in 
comparison to: 
control group / 
baseline 
n Dependent 
Variable 
Country Method of 
causal 
analysis 
Remarks 
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(2) Feedback, Social Comparison 
[+ Energy saving tips, Comparison to usage history, Graphical 
enhancement] 
Like (1), the HER additionally contained information about the 
gas consumption, frequency random (monthly/quarterly)
(2) 
(-1,22)*** / n.a.
(3) Feedback, Social Comparison 
[+ Energy saving tips, Comparison to usage history, Graphical 
enhancement] 
Like (2), gas consumption measured instead of electricity 
consumption
(3) 
(-1,20)*** / n.a.
(4) Control Group 
No information about participation in experiment
(4) 
CG / n.a.
Costa and 
Kahn 
(2013) 
(1) Feedback, Social Comparison 
[+ Energy saving tips, Comparison to usage history] 
 Home Energy Reports (HER)  about electricity consumption 
via mail, monthly for heavy users, quarterly for light users, 
with tips to save energy, personal history of consumption and 
comparison to neighbors
(1) 
Liberals:  
(-2,4)*** / n.a. 
 
Conservatives:  
(-1,7)*** / n.a.
81 772 Electricity US RCT The study especially analyzes the 
intervention´s heterogeneous effects 
(„Liberals“ vs. „Conservatives“). The 
average treatment effect is  
(-2.1)*** compared to the control 
group. 
Long run effects:  
n.a. 
Costs:  
According to the authors, the 
intervention might be cost-effective, 
but no specific statement. 
 
(2) Control  Group 
No information about participation in experiment
(2) 
CG / n.a.
Dolan and 
Metcalfe 
(2013) 
(1) Feedback, Social Comparison 
Biannual feedback and comparison to neighbors´ 
consumption via mail
(1) 
(-4,4)*** /   n.a.
569 Gas GB RCT 
 
Experiment 2 of the article fits 
thematically and is generally suitable 
to identify causal effects, but the 
information in the working paper is 
contradictory and is therefore not 
listed here. 
 
Long run effects:  
(18 months after first Intervention) 
(1) (-7,0)* 
(2) (-6,0) (not sign.) 
(2) Feedback, Social Comparison 
[+ Energy saving tips] 
Like (1) + Tips to save energy
(2) 
(-10,8)*** /   n.a.
(3) Control Group 
Feedback about personal electricity consumption
(3) 
CG / n.a.
Study Type of intervention 
[+ combination with additional interventions] 
and intervention design 
Effect (in %) in 
comparison to: 
control group / 
baseline 
n Dependent 
Variable 
Country Method of 
causal 
analysis 
Remarks 
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Costs:  
According to the authors 333 kWh 
were saved for every Pound spent 
 
Mizobuchi 
and 
Takeuchi 
(2013) 
(1) Feedback 
[+ Financial Incentive, Comparison to usage history] 
Monthly feedback via mail, reward of 200 Yen (2$) for 1% 
reduction of energy consumption
(1) 
(-4,15)** / (- 5,876)**
208 Electricity JP RCT Effects as difference from pre-
treatment-consumption. The 
difference between the effects of (1) 
and (2) is statistically not significant.  
Long run effects:  
n.a. 
Costs:  
n.a. 
 
(2) Feedback, Social Comparison 
[+ Financial Incentive, Comparison to usage history] 
Monthly feedback via mail, comparison to other participating 
households, reward of 200 Yen (2$) for 1% reduction of 
energy consumption
(2)  
(-6,48)** / (-8,196)**
(3) Control Group 
Information about participation in study
(3)  
CG / (-1,721)
Tiefenbeck 
et al. 
(2013) 
(1) Feedback, Social Comparison 
[+ Energy saving tips, Framing (social norm)] 
Weekly feedback about the water consumption per capita 
and tips to save water, partly complemented by a social 
comparison with the 10% saving the most water or a social 
appeal to contribute one´s share to the mutual goal of energy 
conservation
(1) 
Water:  
(-6,0)** / n.a. 
Electricity:  
(+5,6)** / n.a. 
154 Electricity 
 
and  
 
Water
US RCT Study shows adverse effect of 
(intended) savings in water 
consumption for consumption of 
electricity. Since tenants privately 
pay for gas and electricity, while 
water is billed collectively, income 
effects can be excluded. 
Water consumption was measured 
daily, electricity consumption weekly 
Long run effects:  
No more significant effects 
measured after two weeks: 
(1) Water: (-5,5) 
Electricity: (+0,3) 
(2) n.a. 
Costs:  
n.a. 
 
(2) Control Group 
Information that water consumption will be monitored in the 
course of a scientific study 
(2) 
CG / n.a.
(1) Feedback, Social Comparison 
[+ Comparison to usage history, Energy saving tips] 
(1) 
(-1,7)*** / n.a. 
234 000 Electricity US RCT Long run effects: 
2009-2013 (following the 
Study Type of intervention 
[+ combination with additional interventions] 
and intervention design 
Effect (in %) in 
comparison to: 
control group / 
baseline 
n Dependent 
Variable 
Country Method of 
causal 
analysis 
Remarks 
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Allcott and 
Rogers 
(2014)
Monthly feedback via mail ( Home Energy Report with 
personal history of consumption, comparison to neighbors 
and tips to save energy)
measurement of the effect after the 
shipping of four reports, the 
treatment groups were randomly re-
allocated): 
 Stop of the intervention after 
two years: (-2)*** 
 Biannual receipt of Home 
Energy Reports : (-3,1)*** 
 Receipt of the Home Energy 
Reports in initial frequency:  
(-3,3)*** 
Costs:  
Costs of production and shipping of 
the reports divided by kWh of saved 
energy 
 Assuming that the savings-
effect does not last:  
3,2 – 4,44 Cents/kWh 
 Assuming that the effects last 
for the long term:  
1,35 – 1,79 Cents/kWh 
 
(2) Feedback, Social Comparison 
[+ Comparison to usage history, Energy saving tips] 
Quarterly feedback via mail (Home Energy Report like in (1))
(2) 
(-1,2)*** / n.a.  
(3) Control Group 
No information about participation in study
(3) 
CG / n.a. 
Delmas and 
Lessem 
(2014) 
(1) Feedback, Social Comparison 
[+ Comparison to usage history, Reminder] 
Real-time feedback and comparison with other users through 
an online-platform, weekly reminder via e-mail
(1) 
(-5,68) 
(insign.) / n.a.
66 Electricity US RCT Long run effects:  
17 weeks after first intervention 
(1) (-6,5) (not sign.) / n.a. 
(2) (-24,76)* / n.a. 
(3) n.a. 
Costs:  
n.a. 
 
(2) Feedback, Social Comparison 
[+ Comparison to usage history, Reminder] 
Additionally to (1) public rankings of which student rooms 
consume below- or above-average (via posters in the 
entrance hall and via e-mail)
(2) 
(-19,36)** / n.a.
(3) Control Group 
No information about participation in experiment
(3)  
CG / n.a.
Komatsu 
and Nishio 
(2015) 
(1) Feedback, Social Comparison 
Onetime feedback via mail and comparison to median 
consumption
(1) 
No effect sizes given; 
tendencies for 
assessment of own 
3 033 Electricity 
(indirect)
JP RCT In (1)-(3) the participants´ 
assessment of their own electricity 
consumption in comparison to the 
neighbors´ consumption was 
Study Type of intervention 
[+ combination with additional interventions] 
and intervention design 
Effect (in %) in 
comparison to: 
control group / 
baseline 
n Dependent 
Variable 
Country Method of 
causal 
analysis 
Remarks 
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consumption: 
higher**
analyzed, in (4)-(6) it was the 
households´ motivation to save 
energy.  
Long run effects:  
n.a. 
Costs:  
n.a. 
 
(2) Feedback, Social Comparison 
Like (1) plus comparison to highest saving 25% of participants
(2)  
higher ***
(3) Feedback, Social Comparison 
[+ Framing (social norm)] 
Like (2) plus a message about the social acceptance / 
disapproval of own consumption
(3) 
higher ***
(4) Feedback, Social Comparison 
Like (1) 
(4)  
Motivation to save 
energy: insign.
(5) Feedback, Social Comparison 
Like (2) 
(5)  
insign.
(6) Feedback, Social Comparison 
[+ Framing (social norm)] 
Like (3)
(6)  
higher ***
(7) Control Group 
Simple feedback of electricity consumption
(7) 
n.a.
Schultz et 
al. (2015) 
(1) Feedback 
[+ Energy saving tips] 
Real-time feedback via IHD and provision of a „climate 
protection video“
(1)  
(-3,0) (insign.) ) / n.a.
431 Electricity US RCT Long run effects: (three months 
after Intervention) 
(1) (-0,81) (not sign.) 
(2) (+1,13) (not sign.) 
(3) (-7,02)** 
Costs:  
n.a. 
 
(2) Feedback 
[+ Energy saving tips] 
Real-time feedback via IHD with the consumption being 
converted to actual costs, video
(2)  
(insign.) / n.a.
(3) Feedback, Social Comparison 
[+ Energy saving tips] 
Real-time feedback via IHD and comparison to other 
participants, video
(3)  
(-9,0)** / n.a.
(4) Control Group 
Only video, no feedback
(4)  
CG / n.a.
(1) Control Group 
[+ Energy saving tips] 
(1) 
CG / (+40,8) (insign.)
374 Water US RCT Consumption was measured one 
week after the intervention.  
Study Type of intervention 
[+ combination with additional interventions] 
and intervention design 
Effect (in %) in 
comparison to: 
control group / 
baseline 
n Dependent 
Variable 
Country Method of 
causal 
analysis 
Remarks 
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Seyranian 
et al. 
(2015) 
Onetime letter with tips to save energy Long run effects :  
(four weeks after intervention)  
(1) CG / +16.2 (insign.) 
(2) (-11,5)** / +2,6 (insign.)  
(3) (-12,2)** / +2,6 (insign.) 
(4) (-12,1)*** / +3,5 (insign.) 
Costs:  
n.a. 
 
(2) Feedback, Social Comparison 
[+ Energy saving tips, Graphical enhancement] 
Like (1) plus information about own personal consumption in 
comparison to average consumption of neighborhood, 
complemented by a laughing or sad smiley 
(2) 
(-29,74)* / (-0,1)
(3) Control Group 
[+ Energy saving tips, Framing (social norm)] 
Like (1) plus a cover letter with the city logo, emphasizing the 
household´s role as a part of the community and stressing on 
water conservation as a mutual goal
(3) 
(-34,1)** / (+1,4) 
(insign.) 
(4) Control Group 
[+ Energy saving tips, Framing (personal norm)] 
Like (1) plus a cover letter, setting water conservation as a 
goal, but accentuating the household as a single player and 
not as a part of the community 
(4) 
(-24,6) (insign.) / 
(+3,4) (insign.)
Study Type of intervention 
[+ combination with additional interventions] 
and intervention design 
Effect (in %) in 
comparison to: 
control group / 
baseline 
n Dependent 
Variable 
Country Method of 
causal 
analysis 
Remarks 
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Commitment and Goal Setting 
Becker 
(1978) 
(1) Goal Setting 
[+ Energy saving tips] 
Participants were asked to reduce their energy 
consumption by 20% compared to their baseline usage + 
they received energy conservation tips  specific to their 
own household appliances  
(1) 
(-1.3) [insignif.] / n.a.  
100 Electricity US RCT Long run effects: n.a.  
Costs: n.a.  
 
(2) Feedback, Goal Setting 
[+ Energy saving tips] 
Same intervention as in (1) + they received feedback 
about their energy consumption three times a week 
(2) 
(-13) [insignif.] / n.a.  
(3) Goal Setting 
[+ Energy saving tips] 
Participants were asked to reduce their energy 
consumption by 2% compared to their baseline usage +  
they received energy conservation tips  specific to their 
own household appliances 
(3) 
(+1.2) [insignif.] / n.a.  
(4) Feedback, Goal Setting 
[+ Energy saving tips] 
Same intervention as in (3) +  they received feedback 
about their energy consumption three times a week 
(4) 
(-4.6) [insignif.] / n.a.  
(5) Control Group 
Participants of the control group knew they were part of 
an experiment 
(5) 
CG / n.a. 
Winett et 
al. (1979) 
(1) Feedback, Goal Setting 
[+ Comparison to usage history, Graphical enhancement, 
Energy saving tips] 
Daily feedback sheet with information about electricity 
usage + comparison with own usage on the preceeding 
day + a happy or frowning smiley for a decrease or 
increase in consumption + usage change compared to 
baseline + feedback whether they achieved a goal, which 
they had set themselves in a meeting before the start of 
the experiment + energy conservation information 
 
(1) 
(-13)*** / n.a. 
71 Electricity US RCT Long run effects:  
(1) (-11) (insign.) 
(2) (-7) (insign.) 
Effects are calculated relative to the 
mean consumption of the two 
control groups 
Costs: 
Feedback condition: 
- total expenditure per 
household = $26  
Study Type of intervention 
[+ combination with additional interventions] 
and intervention design 
Effect (in %) in 
comparison to: 
control group / 
baseline 
n Dependent 
Variable 
Country Method of 
causal 
analysis 
Remarks 
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(2) Feedback 
[+ Energy saving tips] 
Households had to read and report their daily electricity 
consumption + received energy saving information 
(2) 
(-7)* / n.a. 
- Savings per household $44 from 
expected expenditures based 
on the comparison group's use 
during this same period and the 
marginal cost per KWH.  
self-monitoring:  
-  total expenditure per 
household: $22  
- Savings per household: $26  
 
(3) Control Group 
Households agreed to participate in the study 
(3) 
CG / n.a. 
(4) Control Group 
Households denied to participate in the study 
(4) 
CG / n.a. 
Winett et 
al. (1982) 
Study 1 (during winter): 
(1) Feedback, Goal Setting 
[+ Energy saving tips] 
Participants took part in a meeting and received 
information about energy conservation + they had to sign 
a commitment to  reduce their energy consumption by 
15% within the next 35 days + they received written 
feedback about their energy use + they were provided 
with a tape which presented information on energy 
conservation in form of a discussion 
 
 
(1) 
n.a. / (-13)*** 
83 Electricity US RCT Long run effects: n.a. 
Costs: n.a.  
 
 (2) Goal Setting 
[+Energy saving tips] 
Participants took part in a meeting and received 
information about energy conservation + they had to sign 
a commitment to  reduce their energy consumption by 
15% within the next 35 days + they received a video which 
presented model homes similar to the participants´ 
homes and explained possible ways to reduce energy 
consumption. 
(2) 
n.a. / (-11)*** 
 (3) Feedback, Goal Setting 
[+ Energy saving tips] 
As in treatment (2) +  feedback 
(3) 
n.a. / (-14)*** 
 (4) Goal-Setting  
[+ Energy saving tips] 
(4) 
n.a. / (-1) (insign.) 
Study Type of intervention 
[+ combination with additional interventions] 
and intervention design 
Effect (in %) in 
comparison to: 
control group / 
baseline 
n Dependent 
Variable 
Country Method of 
causal 
analysis 
Remarks 
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As in treatment (1) but without feedback 
 (5) Control Group  
Participants of the control group knew they were part of 
an experiment  
(5) 
CG / (+4)  
 Study 2 (during summer): 
(6) Feedback, Goal Setting 
As in treatment (3) but without information on energy 
conservation 
 
(6) 
n.a. / (-19)*** 
 (7) Feedback, Goal Setting 
[ + Energy saving tips] 
As in treatment (1) but without discussion tape 
(7) 
n.a. / (-22)*** 
 (8) Goal Setting 
[ + Energy saving tips] 
As in treatment (2)  
(8) 
n.a. / (-12) [insign.] 
 
 (9) Control Group  
Participants of the control group knew they were part of 
an experiment 
(9) 
CG / (-2)  
Katzev and 
Johnson 
(1983) 
(1) Goal Setting 
„Foot-in-the-door-treatment”: Households were asked to 
fill in an energy conservation questionnaire. Afterwards, 
they were told to reduce their electricity consumption by 
10% within the next two weeks  
(1) 
n.a. / (+11) [insignif.] 
66 Electricity US RCT The subjects were recruited through 
a door-to-door solicitation 
procedure in which they were asked 
for permission to read their 
electricity meters as part of a study 
on residential energy consumption.  
Long run effects: 
(+1)** 
(-2)*** 
(-5)** 
(+5) 
(all effects compared to baseline 
period; significance compared to 
control group) 
Costs: n.a. 
 
 (2) Goal Setting 
Households were asked to reduce their electricity 
consumption by 10% within the next two weeks 
(2) 
n.a. / (+12) [insignif.]     
 (3) Control Group (3) 
n.a. / (+7) [insignif.]     
 (4) Control Group 
Households agreed to have their electricity meters read 
by the experimenter 
(4) 
CG / 0 
    
Study Type of intervention 
[+ combination with additional interventions] 
and intervention design 
Effect (in %) in 
comparison to: 
control group / 
baseline 
n Dependent 
Variable 
Country Method of 
causal 
analysis 
Remarks 
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Katzev and 
Johnson 
(1984)  
(1) Goal Setting 
[+ Energy saving tips] 
Households were asked to reduce their energy 
consumption by 15%  within the next two weeks + 
received a utility guide for household energy conservation 
(1) 
(-6.1) [insignif.] / (-
13.4) [insignif.] 
90 Electricity US RCT Long run effects:  
(1) (-2.8) / (-14.3)  
(2) (-1.3) / (-12.8)  
(3) (+0.2) / (-11.3)  
(4) (-10.7) / (-22.2)  
(5) (-1.5) / (-13.0) 
(6) CG / (-11.5)  
All effects are insignif.  
Costs: n.a.  
 
 (2) Goal Setting 
Households were asked to reduce their energy 
consumption by 15% within the next two weeks + had to 
fill in an energy conservation survey 
(2) 
(+1.4) [insignif.] / (-
5.9) [insignif.] 
 (3) Control Group 
[+ Financial incentive, Energy saving tips] 
Households received a financial reward depending on the 
amount of electricity saved + a utility guide for household 
energy conservation 
(3) 
(+2.0) [insignif.] / (-
5.3) [insignif.] 
 (4) Goal Setting 
[+ Financial incentive, Energy saving tips] 
Households received a combination of the interventions in 
(2) and (3)  
(4) 
(-3.7) [insignif.] / (-
11.0) [insignif.] 
 (5) Control Group 
Households were asked to fill in a short energy 
conservation survey 
(5) 
(+7.5) [insignif.] / 
(+0.2) [insignif.] 
 (6) Control Group 
Households agreed to have their electricity meters read by 
the experimenters 
(6) 
CG / (-7.3) [insignif.] 
van 
Houwelinge
n and van 
Raaij (1989) 
(1) Feedback, Goal Setting 
[+ Energy saving tips] 
SmartMeter and IHDs were installed and households 
were asked to monthly jot down their preferred and 
actual consumption of gas. Externally imposed goal: 10% 
consumption reduction in comparison to preceding year. 
Additionally tips to save energy. 
(1) 
n.a. / (-12,3)*** 
325 Gas NL RCT10 Long run effects : (one year after 
end of the intervention) 
(1) insign. / (-2,1)*  
(2) insign. / (-3,2)**   
(3) n.a. / (-1,5) (insign.) 
(4) n.a. / (+1,4) (insign.) 
(5) n.a. / (-2,2)* 
(6) n.a. / (-2,9)* 
 (2) Feedback 
[+ Energy saving tips] 
(2) 
n.a. / (-7,7)*** 
    
                                                          
10 The description of the study suggests an experimental design such as an RCT, even though the random assignment (to control and experimental groups) is not explicitly mentioned. 
Study Type of intervention 
[+ combination with additional interventions] 
and intervention design 
Effect (in %) in 
comparison to: 
control group / 
baseline 
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Variable 
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analysis 
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Monthly feedback (not stated through which canal) and 
tips to save energy 
Costs:  
n.a. 
  (3) Feedback 
[+ Energy saving tips] 
Households were asked to document their monthly gas 
consumption on observation sheets, additionally tips to 
save energy 
(3) 
n.a. / (-5,1)*** 
    
 (4) Control Group 
[+ Energy saving tips] 
Provision of tips to save energy 
(4) 
n.a. / (-4,3)** 
     
 (5) Control Group 
No information about participation in experiment 
(5) 
n.a. / (-0,3) (insign.) 
     
 (6) Control Group 
Contacted households did not want to participate in the 
experiment 
(6) 
CG / (-0,2) (insign.) 
     
McCalley 
and 
Midden 
(2002) 
Laboratory study, in which the participants had to set up 
washing machines on a computer: the first six washing cycles 
for an evaluation of the „base consumption“, which the 
participants received feedback about. The following 
interventions were randomly assigned, afterwards another 20 
washing cycles.  
 100 Electricity NL Laboratory 
Experiment 
Long run effects :  
n.a. 
Costs: 
n.a. 
 
 (1) Control Group 
No Feedback, no goal 
(1)  
CG / no difference to 
(2) 
 (2) Feedback 
Feedback, no goal 
(2) 
n.a. / (-9,6) (insign.) 
 (3) Feedback, Goal Setting, Commitment 
Feedback, self-imposed goal (Options:  0%, 5%, 10%, 
15%,20%) 
(3) 
(-12,3***) / (-21,9)*** 
 (4) Feedback, Goal Setting 
Feedback, externally imposed goal (20%) 
(4) 
(-9,9)** / (-19,5)** 
Abrahamse 
et al. 
(2007) 
(1) Feedback, Goal Setting 
Externally set goal of energy conservation (5%), online 
feedback about personal consumption after two and five 
months 
(1) + (2) 
significant difference 
189 Electricity,  
Gas  
NL RCT Effects refer to direct energy 
consumption, not to the as well 
measured indirect consumption, 
because the indirect consumption 
Study Type of intervention 
[+ combination with additional interventions] 
and intervention design 
Effect (in %) in 
comparison to: 
control group / 
baseline 
n Dependent 
Variable 
Country Method of 
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analysis 
Remarks 
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 (2) Feedback, Goal Setting 
[+ Framing (social norm)] 
Like (1) plus a mutual goal (all together saving 5%) and 
online feedback about the group´s consumption after two 
and five months 
to control group*** / 
(-8,3)
(and 
gasoline) 
strongly varied and was not seen as 
robust by the authors. For the 
analysis of the direct energy 
consumption both treatment groups 
were taken together, as there were 
no significant differences between 
them. 
Long run effects :  
n.a. 
Costs:  
n.a. 
 
 (3) Control Group 
Twice filling out a questionnaire, no other intervention 
(3) 
CG / (+0,4) (insign.)
Harding 
and Hsiaw 
(2014)
Offer for customers to participate in program to save 
electricity. Range of goals to set for oneself between 0%, 0-
15%, 15-50%, over 50%
12 451 Electricity US Matching Households with optimistic goals 
(15-50%) save quite a lot shortly 
after start of the program. This 
effect wanes after two to three 
months, presumably because the 
consumers realized that they would 
not be able to reach their very 
optimistic goals. 
Long run effects ( after 18 months) 
for (2): 
 Significant effects with 
significance level of 95%; no 
specific statements about size 
Costs: 
n.a. 
 
(1) Feedback, Goal Setting, Commitment 
[+ Comparison to usage history] 
Self-set goal: 0%, daily access to website with monthly 
bills of consumption 
(1) 
(-1,5) (not sign.) / n.a.
(2) Feedback, Goal Setting, Commitment 
[+ Comparison to usage history] 
Self-set goal : 0 - 15%, daily access to website with 
monthly bills of consumption
(2) 
(-11,0)** / n.a. 
(3) Feedback, Goal Setting, Commitment 
[+ Comparison to usage history] 
Self-set goal : 15-50%, daily access to website with 
monthly bills of consumption
(3) 
(-1,0) (not sign.) / n.a.
(4) Feedback, Goal Setting, Commitment 
[+ Comparison to usage history] 
Self-set goal : über 50%, daily access to website with 
monthly bills of consumption
(4) 
0 / n.a. 
(5) Control Group 
No information about participation in experiment
(5) 
CG / n.a.
Labeling 
Laboratory experiment: Choice between four refrigerators 120 NL 
Study Type of intervention 
[+ combination with additional interventions] 
and intervention design 
Effect (in %) in 
comparison to: 
control group / 
baseline 
n Dependent 
Variable 
Country Method of 
causal 
analysis 
Remarks 
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Verplanken 
and 
Weenig 
(1993) 
(1) Control Group 
Information on consumption in kWh, no time pressure 
(1) 
27
Electricity 
(indirect) 
Choice-
Experiment 
with random 
assignment 
to 
experimental 
groups 
Effect = share of group that prefers 
an efficient refrigerator to an 
inefficient one in % 
Long run effects : 
n.a. 
Costs: 
n.a. 
 
(2) Labeling 
[+ graphical enhancement] 
Annual energy consumption as graphical label (measured 
in local currency), no time pressure 
(2) 
50*
(3) Control Group 
Information on consumption in kWh, time pressure (5 
minutes for decision) 
(3) 
33
(4) Labeling 
[+ graphical enhancement] 
Annual energy consumption as graphical label, time 
pressure 
(4) 
23
Kurz et al. 
(2005)  
(1) Labeling 
A series of labels was placed on different appliances in the 
household:  refrigerators, air conditioners, showers, 
washing machines, clothes dryers, dishwashers, toilets 
and outdoor taps. The labels provided information about 
the water and energy-consumption levels of the labeled 
appliances.  
(1) 
n.a. / from insign. to (-
23)** 
166 Electricity 
and Water 
AU RCT The study reports the effects for 
seven weeks separately, without 
documenting an average treatment 
effect. Therefore, we report the 
interval of the documented effects. 
Long run effects: n.a.  
Costs: n.a. 
 
(2) Control Group 
Households were provided with the same information as 
in treatment (1) but in the form of information leaflets 
instead of labels 
(2) 
n.a. / insignif.  
(3) Feedback, Social Comparison  
[ + Graphical enhancement] 
Households received e-mails with graphical feedback on 
their levels of water and energy consumption and a 
comparison to other households of similar size who 
participated in the study 
(3) 
n.a. / insignif.
Brounen 
and Kok 
(2011) 
Labeling 
Analysis of the effect of the EU label for energy efficiency on 
the sales price of houses with a „green“ label (A, B or C) 
(+3,7)*** 31 993 Electricity, 
water, gas 
(indirect) 
NL 
 
Observation 
study, 
controlled 
for self-
selection 
Effect = average mark-up in % on 
houses with „green“ label relative to 
comparable houses  
Long run effects: 
n.a. 
Study Type of intervention 
[+ combination with additional interventions] 
and intervention design 
Effect (in %) in 
comparison to: 
control group / 
baseline 
n Dependent 
Variable 
Country Method of 
causal 
analysis 
Remarks 
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with two-
step 
Heckman-
procedure 
Costs: 
n.a. 
 
Heinzle 
(2012) 
Experiment 1:  
Participants are asked to evaluate the energy saving potential 
of different TVs. The provided information varies: 
Electricity 
(indirect) 
DE Choice-
Experiments 
with random 
assignment 
to 
experimental 
groups 
within a 
survey  
 
(1) Labeling 
Consumption information in Watt and current price for 
electricity 
(1) 
18,6 / 66,3 / 15,1
(1)-(3) 
252
Effects (1)-(3) =  
Proportion of participants who 
correctly estimate the energy saving 
potential in % / who overestimate / 
who underestimate 
(2) Labeling 
Consumption information in Watt 
(2) 
19,8 / 64,0 / 16,3
(3) Labeling 
Actual annual operating costs of the devices 
(3) 
92,5 / 3,8 / 3,8 *** 
(significant difference 
to the other 
treatment groups)
Experiment 2: 
Choice between two TVs with differing information: 
 
(4) Control Group 
Consumption information in Watt (60 Watt vs. 225 Watt) 
(4) 
481,22
(4)-(6) 
208
Effects (4)-(6) =  
Median willingness to pay for a more 
efficient TV in Euro (actual saving 
potential: 480 Euro). 
Long run effects: 
n.a. 
Costs:  
n.a. 
 
(5) Labeling 
Absolute operating costs for the course of ten years  
(180€ vs. 660 €) 
(5) 
641,96**
(6) Labeling 
Annual operating costs (18€/year vs. 66€/year) 
(6) 
353,97**
Houde 
(2014) 
Natural Experiment 1: Electricity 
(indirekt) 
US Two natural 
experiments 
Effects (1)+(2) =  
Average willingness to pay for the 
Energy Star Label in $ / share of total 
price for refrigerator in % 
(1) Labeling 
The tightening of the criteria for the receipt of the 
Energy Star Label in 2008 in the US allowed to observe 
the willingness to pay for the same models of 
(1) 
(+19)** / 1,5
Study Type of intervention 
[+ combination with additional interventions] 
and intervention design 
Effect (in %) in 
comparison to: 
control group / 
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Variable 
Country Method of 
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analysis 
Remarks 
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refrigerators in the same store with and without the 
label (before and after the change of regulation) 
Long run effects:  
n.a. 
Costs: 
The opportunity costs of imperfect 
information amount to about $ 15 
per refrigerator sold. Extrapolated 
on the whole market for 
refrigerators that makes a sum of 
$ 135 mil/year. According to the 
author that is twice as much as 
the annual costs for the Energy 
Star Label program. 
 
Natural Experiment 2: 
(2) Labeling 
In January 2010 it was published that some refrigerators 
received the Energy Star Label, although they did not 
actually fulfil the criteria (incorrect appliance of the test 
procedure). Because the following withdrawal of the 
label could not be anticipated by either the producers or 
the customers, the label´s value can be determined by 
the willingness to pay for these models of refrigerators 
before and after January 2010. 
(2) 
(+89,6) (insign.) / 7,07
(2) 
184 645
Newell and 
Siikamäki 
(2014)
Survey (online) about six different hypothetical purchase 
decisions for warm water processors. There are three boilers 
to choose from. The boilers differ in price and each boiler is 
labelled with a different version of the Energy Star Label, 
which differ in the kind of information that is provided: 
1 184 Electricity 
and gas 
(indirect)
US Choice-
Experiment 
with random 
assignment 
to 
experimental 
groups
Effects =  
relative willingness to pay for 
energy-efficient devices: a WTP of 1 
stands for cost minimizing behavior, 
where a change in sales price and a 
change in the operating costs are 
equally weighted. A value lower than 
1 shows an underestimation of 
savings through energy efficiency, 
while a value greater than 1 shows 
an overestimation. The significance 
is measured as the difference to 1. 
Long run effects: 
n.a. 
Costs: 
n.a. 
 
(1) Labeling 
Only the simple consumption information is provided
(1) 
0,7**
(2) Labeling 
Like (1) + relative consumption costs in comparison to 
different devices
(2) 
0,68**
(3) Labeling 
Like (2) + Information about the CO2 emissions
(3) 
0,93 (insign.) 
(4) Labeling 
Like (2) + specific information on energy consumption
(4) 
1,02 (insign.)
(5) Labeling 
[+ graphical enhancement] 
Wie (4) + awarded with an „Energy-Star-Label“ 
(5) 
1,36**
(6) Labeling 
[+ graphical enhancement] 
(6) 
1,34**
Study Type of intervention 
[+ combination with additional interventions] 
and intervention design 
Effect (in %) in 
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Like (1) + Information about energy consumption in 
relation to other devices in overseeable nuances (A-G 
ranking: „EU-Style“)
Ölander 
and 
Thøgersen 
(2014)
Choice between four TV devices with different labels; 
question which device the customer would buy
151 Electricity 
(indirect)
DK Choice-
Experiment 
with random 
assignment 
to 
experimental 
groups 
Long run effects: 
n.a. 
Costs: 
n.a. 
 
(1) Labeling 
Labels with energy efficiency grades from A - G
(1) + (2)  
The scale from A – G 
more than doubled 
the probability to 
choose an energy-
efficient device in 
comparison to the 
scale from A+++ - D 
(2) Labeling 
Labels with energy efficiency grades from A+++ - D
Allcott and 
Taubinsky 
(2015)
Experiment 1: 
Choice between an energy-saving bulb and three 
conventional bulbs with comparable power. 
(1) + (2)   
1 533
Electricity 
(indirect)
US Experiment 
1:  
„Artificial 
field 
experiment“: 
Choice - 
Experiment 
with random 
assignment 
to 
experimental 
groups. One 
of 30 choices 
(randomly 
selected) 
leads to 
actual buying 
decision. 
For experiment 1 several treatment 
groups were summarized for the 
analysis. 
 
Effects (1) =  
Willingness to pay in Dollar for an 
energy-saving bulb in comparison 
to a conventional bulb and in 
comparison to the control group 
(2) 
(1) Labeling 
Information about consumption, cost saving with energy-
saving bulbs, downsides of energy-saving bulbs (+ 
Information like in (2)) 
(1) 
(+2,30)*** / n.a. 
(2) Control Group 
Information about amount of energy-saving bulbs sold 
and sales development in the past.
(2) 
CG
Experiment 2: 
Customers in a big electrical store were asked about their 
consumption behavior and with their individual information a 
comparison of the energy consumption of energy-saving bulbs 
and conventional bulbs was provided via Ipad: 
(3) Labeling 
[+ Financial incentive] 
Annual and total energy costs + discount coupon  
(10% on all bulbs) 
(3) 
(-2,2) (insign.) 
(3)-(6) 
1 087 
Experiment 
2: RCT 
Effects (3)-(6) = 
Probability of the purchase of an 
energy-saving bulb in comparison to 
conventional bulbs after the 
Study Type of intervention 
[+ combination with additional interventions] 
and intervention design 
Effect (in %) in 
comparison to: 
control group / 
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(4) Labeling 
[+ Financial incentive] 
Annual and total energy costs + discount coupon (10% on 
all bulbs, 30% on energy-saving bulbs) 
(4) 
(+11,0) (insign.) 
information treatment and in 
comparison to the control group in 
percentage points. 
Long run effects:  
n.a. 
Costs: 
n.a. 
 
(5) Control Group 
[+ Financial incentive] 
No interview/information, discount coupon (10% on all 
bulbs, 30% on energy-saving bulbs) 
(5) 
+(7,8)* 
(6) Control Group 
[+ Financial incentive] 
No interview/information, discount coupon (10% on all 
bulbs) 
(6) 
CG; Probability for 
purchase of an 
energy-saving bulb: 
38% 
Waechter 
et al. 
(2015)
Experiment 1:  
On the basis of a scale from 0 (not efficient) to 100 (very 
efficient) the participants had to estimate the energy 
consumption of a TV. Four different versions of a label 
(randomly assigned) provided information on the grade of 
energy efficiency (A – high, B – low) and the electricity 
consumption (high, low).
Experiment 1: Experi-
ment 1: 
166
Electricity 
(indirect)
Online-
experime
nt, which 
was 
conducte
d in 
Switzerla
nd
Experiment 
1:  
Choice-
Experiment 
with random 
assignment 
to 
experimental 
groups 
Dependent variables: 
Experiment 1: 
Estimation of the energy efficiency 
of the TV devices 
(1) Labeling 
Information about the grade of energy efficiency of the 
TV devices
(1)  
The higher the grade 
of energy efficiency, 
the lower the 
estimates for the 
electricity 
consumption 
(significant***)  
(2) Control Group 
Information about the electricity consumption of the TV 
devices
(2) 
No effect on estimates 
of electricity 
consumption
Experiment 2:  
On the basis of two devices with different labels, participants 
had to decide which device they would recommend to an 
Experi-
ment 2: 
305 
Experiment 
2:  
no groups 
Experiment 2:  
Share of participants who wrongly 
recommended the device with the 
Study Type of intervention 
[+ combination with additional interventions] 
and intervention design 
Effect (in %) in 
comparison to: 
control group / 
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analysis 
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energy conserving person. The device with the higher grade of 
energy efficiency thereby featured the higher actual energy 
consumption. 
higher actual energy consumption 
in % 
(1) Labeling 
Device = TV
(1) 
44.6
(2) Labeling 
Device = Freezer
(2) 
72.8
Experiment 3:  
On the basis of two different labels participants had to 
evaluate the energy consumption of a freezer in comparison 
to a reference refrigerator, whereas the labels differed only in 
the grade of energy efficiency, but not in actual energy 
consumption. 
Experi-
ment 3: 
166
Experiment 
3:  
Choice-
Experiment 
with random 
assignment 
to 
experimental 
groups 
Experiment 3:  
Estimation of the energy 
consumption of the freezer 
compared to the reference 
refrigerator on a scale from 1 to 
100  
Long run effects:  
n.a. 
Costs:  
n.a. 
 
(1) Labeling 
Label: „Grade of energy efficiency: A+++“
(1) 67.72**
(2) Control Group 
„ Grade of energy efficiency: A+“
(2) 77.07 (CG)
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Appendix B (Intended for online publication): 
 
The keyword search in EconLit comprised the categories “Title”, “Abstract”, and “Subjects (SU)” for both 
journal articles and working papers. In ScienceDirect, we searched with keywords in the category “Abstract, 
Title, Keywords” and included articles from the disciplines “Economics, Econometrics, Finance”, 
“Psychology”, “Social Sciences”, “Environment”, and ”Energy”. 
 
Table B1: „List of Keywords“ 
Intervention Keywords 
Social Comparison "social norms" OR "social learning" OR "social modeling" OR "social influence" OR "peer 
comparison" OR "peer information" OR "comparative energy information" OR "feedback"  
AND 
"energy conservation" OR "energy consumption" OR "energy use" OR "energy usage" OR 
"energy demand*" OR "energy saving" OR  "electricity conservation" OR "electricity 
consumption" OR “electricity use” OR "electricity usage" OR "electricity demand*" OR 
“electricity saving” OR “gas conservation” OR "gas consumption" OR "gas use" OR “gas usage” 
OR “gas demand*” OR “gas saving” OR "water conservation" OR “water consumption” OR 
"water use" OR “water usage” OR “water demand*” OR “water saving” OR "conservation 
behavior" 
Commitment  "pre-commitment" OR "precommitment" OR "pledge" OR "behavioral contract" OR 
"commitment contract" OR "commitment devices" OR "commitment approach*" OR "personal 
commitment" OR "public commitment" OR "self-control" OR "self-regulation" 
AND 
"energy conservation" OR "energy consumption" OR "energy use" OR "energy usage" OR 
"energy demand*" OR "energy saving" OR  "electricity conservation" OR "electricity 
consumption" OR “electricity use” OR "electricity usage" OR "electricity demand*" OR 
“electricity saving” OR “gas conservation” OR "gas consumption" OR "gas use" OR “gas usage” 
OR “gas demand*” OR “gas saving” OR "water conservation" OR “water consumption” OR 
"water use" OR “water usage” OR “water demand*” OR “water saving” OR "conservation 
behavior" 
Goal-Setting "goal setting" 
AND 
"energy conservation" OR "energy consumption" OR "energy use" OR "energy usage" OR 
"energy demand*" OR "energy saving" OR  "electricity conservation" OR "electricity 
consumption" OR “electricity use” OR "electricity usage" OR "electricity demand*" OR 
“electricity saving” OR “gas conservation” OR "gas consumption" OR "gas use" OR “gas usage” 
OR “gas demand*” OR “gas saving” OR "water conservation" OR “water consumption” OR 
"water use" OR “water usage” OR “water demand*” OR “water saving” OR "conservation 
behavior" 
Labeling "energy labeling" OR "energy labelling" OR "information label*" OR "energy information" OR 
"energy label" OR "information acquisition" OR "information disclosure" OR "environmental 
certification" 
AND 
"energy conservation" OR "energy consumption" OR "energy use" OR "energy usage" OR 
"energy demand*" OR "energy saving" OR  "electricity conservation" OR "electricity 
consumption" OR “electricity use” OR "electricity usage" OR "electricity demand*" OR 
“electricity saving” OR “gas conservation” OR "gas consumption" OR "gas use" OR “gas usage” 
OR “gas demand*” OR “gas saving” OR "water conservation" OR “water consumption” OR 
"water use" OR “water usage” OR “water demand*” OR “water saving” OR "conservation 
behavior" 
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Analysis refers to this standardized inclusion decision form in Citavi. If one of the criteria was coded 
with “no”, the study was excluded from the systematic review.   
Table B2: „Inclusion Decision Form“ 
Author (year) Text 
Title Text 
Name of coder Text 
  
Study includes applied research (not just theoretical 
models) 
Options: yes / no / discuss 
Study includes at least one of the chosen interventions 
 
Options: Feedback / Social Comparison / Commitment 
/ Goal-Setting / Labeling / discuss 
Study refers to at least one of the outcome variables  
 
Options: gas / water / electricity / discuss 
Study targets private households or individuals in 
private households 
 
Options: yes / no / discuss 
Study was carried out in a developed country  
 
Options: yes / no / discuss 
  
Inclusion decision Options: include / exclude / relevant meta-study / 
discuss 
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Table B3: „Coding Sheet“ 
Study Authors (year) Text 
Type of intervention e.g.  
(1)  1 
(2)  1+2 
(3)  1+2+4 
(4) 0 
Open code 
0 = Control group 
1 = Feedback 
2 = Social comparison 
3 = Commitment  
4 = Goal-setting 
5 = Labeling 
 
1+2= Feedb.+ Social Comparison 
3+4= Commitment + Goal-Setting 
Intervention design 
 
 
e.g.  
(1) Onetime letter, external goal 
(5%) 
(2) Onetime letter, self-set goal 
(3) Onetime letter, external goal, 
comparison with another 
treatment group 
Text 
Combination with additional 
interventions  
e.g.  
(1) None  
(2) Energy saving tips 
(3) None 
Text 
Effect (in %) in comparison to: 
control group / baseline 
 
Significance level: 
***: p < 0,01 
**: p < 0,05 
*: p < 0.10 
(insign.): not significant  
e.g.  
(1) (-2,2)** / (-5,4)** 
(2) (-2,7)* / (-10,0)* 
(3) (-0.5) (insignif.) / (-1,9)* 
(4) KG / (-1,1) (insignif.) 
 
Number  
N e.g.   
34000 
Number 
Dependent variable  
 
e.g.  
2  
Open Code 
1 = Electricity  
2 = Water 
3 = Gas 
 
For Labeling: 
1A = Electricity (indirectly) 
2A = Water (indirectly) 
3A = Gas (indirectly) 
Country e.g. 
US 
Country code 
Method of causal analysis 
 
e.g.  
1 
 
Open code 
1 = RCT 
2 = Matched Comparison 
3 = RDD 
4 = Diff-in-Diff 
5 = FE 
6 = Other 
Remarks 
 
e.g.  
(1) Limitations 
(2) Cost-benefit-analysis 
(3) Long run effect + follow-up 
period after intervention  
Text 
 
 
 
 
 
 
